

Velikovsky's "Sigmund Freud and Moses the Lawgiver"

With Commentary In Italic by Eric Miller

[Note To Commentary: All of my comments are separately entered in brackets and in italic. I have presented Velikovsky's comments in full, as I believed it was necessary to do so for the reader to have a clear view of his "argument." I do not, as yet, know when Velikovsky wrote his remarks. But I suspect it was sometime in the early part of the 1940's. Freud, of course, published his book on Moses and Monotheism in 1939. In 1941 Velikovsky published his (and the) first psychoanalytic remarks on Freud in The Dreams Freud Dreamed. As Velikovsky mentions in the article below that he intends to write "the more profound reasons for his [Freud's] renunciation of his race" it is assumed his article dealt with here was written circa 1940.

*I am using Velikovsky's essay and my comments on it to lead off a series of commentaries I will be making and posting to my website www.passionformurder.com on the subject of **Freud's Murder of Moses**. I hope with this opening salvo to give an historical context to the subject of Freud's murder of Moses and how he tried to disguise it by cleverly "coding" his crime in psychoanalytic games—which, as Velikovsky, without being aware of Freud's true condition, points out, isn't even really a proper subject for psychoanalysis.*

Velikovsky, to his credit, came to accept my analysis and discovery that Freud was suffering from "homicidal mania" through our many conversations and shared communications in the mid 1970's. The discovery of Freud's murder mania, naturally, goes beyond an isolated examination of Freud himself and also involves how Freud was received in the Psychoanalytic confraternity itself and the Jewish Psychoanalytic confraternity, in particular. That is why I begin this examination with Velikovsky's own examination of Sigmund Freud and Moses the Lawgiver. The opening paragraph below commences Velikovsky's article, followed by my bracketed italicized comments.]

Twice Freud strayed away into a by-path off the high road of psychoanalytic investigation—once, many years ago, when he wrote a study of aesthetics, and the second time in his eighties, when he undertook an inquiry into biblical history. Both times the prophet Moses was the object of his investigation. In the first instance it was Michelangelo's statue of Moses, selected out of all the work produced by Michelangelo and from all the other creations of the plastic arts. Later it was Moses the law-giver, whose historic figure exercised a compelling effect on the spiritual vision of the creator of depth psychology.

*[At the outset we must question: was Moses actually an historic figure? This is far from certain, though it appears to be an underlying assumed fact by Velikovsky. That Moses "exercised a compelling effect on the spiritual vision" of Freud is, I believe, a mistaken remark. Velikovsky stands on terra infirma. Velikovsky should have known that Freud did **not** believe in "spiritual visions" and, moreover, there is no "spiritual vision" in Freud's work—Freud declared himself an out right atheist and did not ascribe to "spiritual" values at all. For Freud, all such "higher" values were the result of mechanistic psychological effects aimed at subverting the murderous will of the individual to the requirements of the group and the satisfaction of instinctual needs. How is it that Velikovsky, who was Jewish, a medical doctor, an historian, a psychoanalyst and in many respects a learned man did not know this? Long before he died, Freud made it clear to the world that he was an out and out unbeliever—and I know of no writings of his where he ever proclaimed he had any "spiritual vision." Why would Velikovsky just make up such characterizations of the misanthropic Freud implying that Freud gave gifts of "spiritual visions" to the world?]*

Is this accidental? A man may accidentally meet another twice at the same spot, but it is not accidental when an old man returns to the place where once, in the full vigor of his manhood, a figure held him enthralled. What compelled the man who maintained that he was ignorant of the "oceanic feeling" of religious experience to approach the great religious founder and attempt to illuminate his spiritual aspect as well as the traits of his appearance? He said that religion was a neurosis; was he seeking the traits of neurosis in Moses? In not a single line has he given any indication of this. "I decided to put it away [the work], but it haunted me like an unlaid ghost." ⁽¹⁾ Something profoundly personal is hinted at in such a confession.

[In the above paragraph Velikovsky apparently contradicts his earlier remark in his first paragraph by stating Freud was devoid of the "religious experience." Is Velikovsky making a covert case for the idea that "spiritual

visions” are a breed apart from “religious experiences”? And, if he does, what is the distinction? We are not told.

That Freud believed that religion was a neurosis but that he sought no sign of “neurosis” in Moses, the highest of religious figures for the Jewish people, begs the question of what Freud is attempting to deal with in his essays on his “unlaid ghost”—i.e., Moses. Velikovsky realizes that “something profoundly personal is hinted at in such a confession.” Velikovsky will obliquely answer the question of the “something” that was profoundly personal to Freud by claiming that Freud was hinting at the fact that didn’t want to be a Jew.

It is my thesis, my “legal theory,” in fact, that Freud’s “unlaid ghost” was really his half-brother, John Freud, whose Jewish name was “Moses.” Freud’s discussion of “Moses” was simply his covert way of referring to and musing over his brother—murder. I will here and throughout a series of commentaries on the matter adduce much credible evidence for this “legal theory”—that Freud’s “primal murder victim” was John Moses Freud.

Freud’s work on Moses, the Egyptian, is not a psychoanalytical or psychological study. But we shall proceed in the manner of Freud when delivering over the author of a literary work to the tribunal of psychoanalysis.

If Freud’s work was not, as Velikovsky avers, a psychoanalytical or psychological matter, what then is it? Velikovsky proposes to treat Freud’s non-psychological or non-psychoanalytical “literary” work on Moses as a fit subject, for “delivering him over to a tribunal of psychoanalysis.” The very language Velikovsky uses, psychologically identifies his own examination of Freud (following Freud himself) as though it were a matter for a legal proceeding—and, indeed, it is, but not as Velikovsky then imagined it.

To be frank, the very language Velikovsky uses indicates his own self-mezmerization with the presumed prowess of “psychoanalytical opinion” (his own) having the status, in his mind, of a legal “judgment” (i.e., “delivering over the author [Freud] of a literary work to the tribunal of psychoanalysis.” Is this statement not itself an indication that Velikovsky was going to submit Freud to Jewish judgment for the way Freud handled the sacred subject of Moses?

Of course, Velikovsky’s opening comment that Freud only abandoned the psychological or psychoanalytical field twice before, as he mentions, is itself not at all true. Who, on reflection, would agree, for instance, that Freud’s essay on Leonardo De Vinci anywhere approached an alleged

“scientific” psychological or psychoanalytical study? Or who, knowing that Freud’s case histories were criminal frauds would “buy into” Velikovsky’s high sounding rhetoric? One begins to have grounds for fearing Velikovsky’s own psychoanalytical “tribunal” quite likely will not meet any standard for psychological science or proper legal proceeding.

But, no doubt, much as Ernest Jones, one of Freud’s foremost disciples analyzed the literary work of Shakespeare in his study of Hamlet is what Velikovsky had in mind. But, Freud is no Hamlet, he is a real person. Velikovsky obviously means that because Freud’s “study” of “Moses” is a work of fiction, he is entitled to examine the creator of the work of fiction, as Freud—for example—psychoanalyzed Dostoyevsky, in his Dostoyevsky and Parricide. I fear a Star Chamber proceeding is about to commence—with Velikovsky’s “tribunal.”

Unless one follows the traditions which have been handed down, a reconstruction of the personality of Moses is not possible on the basis of the remainder of the available historical material. When such an attempt is made to mold anew a statue of this giant from the scraps of relevant history—to give not an analysis of the tradition, but a synthesis of the personality—then we have before us an artistic creation, just as Michelangelo’s prophet with the tablets is an artistic creation. But by referring to such a statue we should not attempt to make an analysis of what is hidden in the mythical past [i.e., the legend of Moses], but rather an analysis of the artist.

It is questionable that by “following the traditions” one can “reconstruct” the “personality” of Moses—whether Moses was a real or imagined person. What can Velikovsky possibly mean by stating that “it is not possible on the basis of the remainder of the available historical material” to reconstruct the personality of Moses? There is no “remainder” of “available historical material” other than the “traditions” themselves. There are, in fact, no “scraps of relevant history” other than the traditions and Jewish legends. Indeed, one is just as justified in doubting the historical existence of Moses as we are in doubting the historical existence of Osiris. Apparently, Velikovsky buys into the historicity on some accounts and considers it the “mythical past” in what he can’t credit. Is this really much different than Freud?

Velikovsky is, of course, correct in stating that when an attempt is made to “mold anew a statute” of Moses we are dealing with a work of the imagination (whether it is a work of “art” or not, notwithstanding). But whether Freud’s discursive literary act of the imagination and interpretation is of the same nature of Michelangelo’s visual creation of the statue of Moses is open to obvious serious question. Actually Velikovsky’s above paragraph is, on analysis, itself perplexing. The fact is, of course, as

to the “reality” of “Moses” as an “historical” figure we know nothing of his appearance and only interpret writings and “personality” ascribed to him. (Shall we credit, for example, that Moses had “horns” and could work miracles?). None of it has anything provably to do with “history.” That no one, of sane mind, should attempt to analyze what is “hidden in the mythical past” by psychoanalyzing Moses via a statue by Michelangelo is obvious. But, though Velikovsky does not say it and didn’t know it at the time, Freud was not a man of sane mind.

Whatever is alien to Freud in the traditional figure of Moses will be regarded in his inquiry as alien to Moses; whatever there is in the figure of Moses that fails to reflect Freud’s concept will be found in historical and exegetical excursions and bound up with the inquiry.

Velikovsky, it seems to me, has inverted the declarative meaning of his statement. Clearly Velikovsky means to say that what Freud sees in Moses is a reflection of what is in himself. Simply, Freud “projects” his own sense of being an “alien” onto Moses from his own sense of being an “alien.” Velikovsky was naturally unaware of Freud’s letters (which didn’t become public until years after Velikovsky wrote his remarks) where Freud overtly confesses to feeling himself to be an “alien”—that people saw him as an alien, and that there was something seriously wrong with him and that because of this he was not able to mature properly. Velikovsky’s statement that--“whatever there is in the figure of Moses that fails to reflect Freud’s concept will be found in historical and exegetical excursions and bound up with the inquiry.”—is incomprehensible and reflects, apparently, Velikovsky’s own inability to deal objectively either with his hero Freud or Moses.

In analysis this is called projection. In order to project one’s inner world onto some personality of the outer world, some similarity must first be found. The associations which lead to this may be positive and also negative. Correspondingly, the associations will be colored by love or negatively charged with hate, everything depending on which unconscious impulses are being outwardly projected. The projections may be on occasion divided up into two personalities: one is taken over by the “good” ego, the other by the “evil” ego; one is idealized and the other hated. Everything which does not correspond to the good or evil ego will either remain unseen or be denied.

Velikovsky is above describing the psychology of a deranged personality, a schizophrenic “split” and this phenomenon in Freud is exactly described by Freud in his description of his relations with “Moses” (John) Freud—where “Moses-John” is his hated enemy and most loved friend who inhabited the same person in his most formative stages of development and determined, he says, all future relations with his contemporaries. But,

*though what Velikovsky says is true of the divided personality, he is not able to demonstrate that Freud had any “love” for his fictional Moses, or that he “hated” his fictional Moses either. That appears to be a matter of “in the eye of the beholder”—i.e., Velikovsky himself. Strangely, Velikovsky says nothing in his comments about what Freud loved and hated in the *Legendary Moses*.*

“Moses is an Egyptian.” How is this proved? Two explanations are given in the first of the three essays, which bears the title of “Moses an Egyptian.” One is historical and philological; the other is psychological and folkloristic. The first one is: “Moses” is an element of many Egyptian names, such as, for example, Ramses (Ra-mose), Thut-mose; *Mose* in Egyptian means child. Hence, Moses was an Egyptian.

*Velikovsky does not make, I believe, the more telling observation in this matter of the name “Mose” (“Mosche” in Hebrew) —one which an Egyptian commentator on the subject does make, and that is that “mose” is the name of a “male” child, in other words “**Son**.” In German, “son” is “**Sohn**”—one letter away from “John.” Additionally, Freud’s psychotic identification with both his victim (“Moses”-John) and himself is easily accomplished due to the fact that Freud’s Jewish name was “ShloMO.” [transposed, in Freud’s style, to “MO she.” MO is also the nickname for Moses. Just as the Freud scholar Mark Kanzer observed that Freud liked to “take turns” playing both the murderer and the victim of John, such is the case, also, with “Moses.” As I shall comment on in the Postscript—Velikovksy is blinded to the most important matter regarding Freud’s “psychoanalysis” of the story of Moses, that there were two Moses and one of them was murdered by the Jews.*

A man who is not an Egyptologist enters on a difficult excursion in order to demonstrate that an Egyptian name is a proof of non-Hebrew descent, but the very man making this endeavor bears the name of Sigmund and is a Jew. Is he aware of the striking inadequacy of his proof? On the basis of such a demonstration, anyone by the name of Sigmund is a Teuton; therefore this demonstration may be rejected, for the same reason that a child of Jewish parents born in Moravia may be called Sigmund.

Of course, “Sigmund’s” birth name was not Sigmund but “Sigismund”—a Catholic/Czech name. As to the question raised by Velikovsky: “Is he aware of the striking inadequacy of his proof?”—the answer is a resounding “Yes”. Freud himself was fully aware that he was more at a covert purpose than an “historical” or “psychoanalytical” one. He wrote, and Velikovsky must have known it, that anyone could easily topple his book on Moses!

In a footnote on page 23, Freud cites Eduard Meyer: “The name Moses is

probably . . . Egyptian. This does not prove, however, that these generations were of Egyptian origin, but it proves that they had relations with Egypt.” To this Freud appends a remarkable question: “One may well ask what kind of relation one is to imagine.”

I fail to see what is “remarkable” about the question Freud asks—mostly it seems a non sequitur. Whatever “relation” one imagines, all we are left with is an “imaginative” one from Velikovsky’s own point of view.

The other, psychological, demonstration that Moses belonged to the Egyptian people is as follows: In many legends about the origin and adulthood of famous men of the past, a stereotype is retained: the hero is of exalted descent; even as a child he is recognized by his father as a future danger to him, is compelled to flee, and is rescued and brought up by poor people; when he is fully grown his noble descent comes to light. Such is the echo resounding through the folk-tales. Since, according to the legend, Moses was born among humble people of an oppressed race, and rescued and brought up by the king’s daughter, Freud associates himself with Eduard Meyer’s idea that the legend was falsified and must be set right; and he arrives at the contention that the historic Moses was of higher descent, of the royal house of Pharaoh, and possibly even the son of the Egyptian princess.

Yes, one can imagine anything one wants and claim that all legends have been falsified, or that none of them have, or that some have and some have not. Obviously the question: what is the basis for believing or not believing this or that “legend” is a “true” story? By definition, of course, a “legend” is a story which is not verifiable.

Freud undertakes a detailed psychological demonstration with reference to folkloristic research into the legends of various peoples and heroes—without noticing that the emendation cannot be equated with the legendary stereotype, if he himself does not regard Moses as a legendary prince but as a real one. The fictional element is the princely origin of the hero. It is true that on the basis of history it can be proved that a legendary hero was no prince by blood, but on the basis of a legend about a non-prince can a scientific proof be adduced that the hero was, nevertheless, an historical prince?

Velikovsky again seems to over-press a faulty if not fatal argument into service to make his point. Velikovsky seems to be saying, ambiguously, that Freud’s folkloristic research cannot emend and equate a legendary stereotype if we are not dealing with a legend but an actual historical personage. The essence of the point I previously raised above to indicate the faulty framework of the very concepts we are dealing with here. It is not true, as Velikovsky avers, that “The fictional element is the princely origin

of the hero”—implying as it does that there is no “fictional” element to the other aspects of the legend, for instance, that there ever was a Moses in the first place, of whatever racial background. What about the stereotypical element that the “hero” came from a “poor” or humble background, is that presumed to be non-fictional. This is a ridiculous train of thought.

And what does it mean, after all, when Velikovsky says that “It is true that on the basis of history it can be proved that a legendary hero was no prince by birth. . .”? Of course, such “proof” at best can only apply to a real (i.e., historical person) and not at all to a mythical, unverifiable, “historical” person.

In the countless folktales the lowly origin of the hero is denied and a nobler one poetically ascribed to him. Accordingly, in revision and correction doubt must be cast upon the princely blood of the hero. If Moses had been named as the son of royal blood in the biblical tradition, then skepticism would be in place and a suspicion justified that the legend had undergone a conventional distortion. But Freud recognizes Moses as an historical prince by blood, and so it is *he* who composes the legend according to its usual stereotype. He would like to maintain that Moses was the son of a princess.⁽²⁾ This anecdote is taken from Freud’s *The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1900.

It is difficult to understand Velikovsky’s meaning in the above passage. He would seem to be making the case that the proper method of dealing with “legends” is to “revise” and “correct” the story of the noble birth of the hero and to degrade his “true” (?) lineage to a non-royal blood—and Velikovsky assumes that if the legend asserts the hero was of royal blood) “then skepticism would be in place and a suspicion justified that the legend had undergone a conventional distortion.” – In other words, I guess, that which is true should be presumed to be the opposite of the legend, i.e., if the legend says “royal birth” we should psychoanalytically assume “non-royal birth.” Why? Truth is on the side of the denial of the “legend”? Obviously a “verifiable” fact cannot be deduced from an “unverifiable” legend.

Simply, Velikovsky takes umbrage at Freud standing the “traditional” psychoanalytical assumptions that the legends are fantasies of common people being actually noble people, and Freud’s desire to make of Moses, a fantasy of being a common man—when actually, unbeknown to the legend-makers he was really a noble man. Velikovsky seems to object—for what reason it is hard to say—to the idea that the “legend” that Moses was a common man is false and the revision that he was really a nobleman is not acceptable to Jewish psychoanalysts—as Freud well knew and that was the fun he had in his madcap confessional game!

From Freud's psychoanalytic point of view the "legend" that Moses was a common man is false as the truth is, as he claims for dream content, "just the reverse." Obviously Jews would not find acceptable the truth that their hero was Not-a-Jew and was Not-a-Common Man, but an Egyptian of Royal birth. That it was an Egyptian who brought "monotheism" into the world—not the Jews and therefore it could be argued that it was the Egyptians who were the "elite" of God, not the Jews, is certainly intolerable to Jewish believers. But, really, what's wrong with that? Since a "legend" is an "unverifiable" story, what's wrong with Freud having his "unverifiable" story instead of the conventional Jewish "unverifiable" story? Of course, none of this has to do with history, but is, again, all part and parcel of Freud's Jewish "joke" against the Jews.

Freud quotes Rank: "As a result of 'national motives' the legend was reconstructed into the version we know."

Usually the "national motive" has the "common man" be actually the "royal man"—but in this case Freud ascribes a "national motive" to the Jews to have the myth that Moses, who as actually an Egyptian royal, become a common man.

Freud is aware that the theory of Moses' Egyptian descent lacks a strong foundation.

. . . Further thought tells us that an original Moses myth of this kind, one not diverging from other birth myths, could not have existed. For the legend is either of Egyptian or of Jewish origin. The first supposition may be excluded. The Egyptians had no motive to glorify Moses; to them he was not a hero. So the legend should have originated among the Jewish people; that is to say, it was attached in the usual version to the person of their leader. But for that purpose it was entirely unfitted; what good is a legend to a people that makes their hero into an alien? (p. 20)

The only thing left was to assume that "in a later, and rather clumsy treatment of the legendary material, the adapter saw fit to equip his hero Moses with certain features appertaining to the classical exposure myths characteristic of a hero." (p. 21)

With this unsatisfactory and even uncertain result our investigation would have to end, without having contributed anything to answering the question whether Moses was an Egyptian, were there not another and perhaps more successful way of approaching the exposure myth itself.

As a rule the real family corresponds to the humble one, the noble family to the fictitious one. In the case of Moses something seemed to be different. And here the new point of view may perhaps bring some illumination. It is

that the first family, the one from which the babe is exposed to danger, is in all comparable cases the fictitious one; the second family, however, by which the hero is adopted and in which he grows up, is his real one. If we have the courage to accept this statement as a general truth to which the Moses legend is also subject, then we suddenly see our way clear: Moses is an Egyptian—probably of noble origin—whom the myth undertakes to transform into a Jew. And that would be our conclusion!” (pp. 21f.)

At this point, where Freud hopes to find the necessary proof, we must expose a logical error. Let us repeat Freud’s train of thought.

A. The legend has been falsified because of national motives; originally the legend had it that Moses was the son of an Egyptian king.

Pure assumption, there is no evidence at all that Moses was originally the “son” of any Egyptian King. Velikovsky “stacks the deck” with his above comment, giving the impression that there was an “original” legend (unverifiable story) that Moses was the son of an Egyptian king. In no version of the legend that I know of was Moses ever the “son of an Egyptian king.” He was always “originally” the son of the daughter of an Egyptian king. Indeed, we may suggest, to thicken the porridge, Moses in the Jewish version was the “son of the King of Kings “and never was really a “common man.” Indeed, God even calls him his “son.” In that sense, one may suggest that the Moses legend itself, as the Jews have it, was always the stereotypical “legend”—or unverifiable story.

B. Since Freud considers this proof inadequate, he establishes another and more convincing one by setting up a rule: the first family is the fictitious one.

There is no such thing as a “proof” involved in the question, at all; it is all artifice and novelistic or psychoanalytical conjuring of Freud’s own imagination or the conventional version. Freud’s setting up “rules” of “first family,” etc. is just stupid and ridiculous and it is odd that Velikovsky characterizes it as anything else. If Velikovsky was holding a valid “tribunal” I think he would be forced to dismiss the case for “lack of evidence” on both sides of the question.

Then for what reason is the first family in the saga fictitious and the later one real? Surely because fantasies concerning noble descent are natural and belong to many people; fantasies concerning lowlier descent are unnatural, for what purpose would they serve? If it is desired to test the Moses legend coolly, critically, and with skepticism, then it would be more plausible to leave him his poor Hebrew parents, and to explain away princesses who discover poor children as figments of the imagination.

Velikovsky fails to realize, apparently, to do so destroys the entire legend—as it is the Jewish version that we would have to deny! Apparently, Velikovsky would rather excise the story given in the Bible than to accept that Moses was raised by Egyptian elite.

It is a wish-fulfillment that Moses was an Egyptian (and that Freud is free-born), and a second, infantile wish-fulfillment that Moses was of royal blood. Freud transforms the elite character of the people into the “chosen” character of his own spiritual model.

Obviously, it is a wish-fulfillment that Moses was an Egyptian—and is it not also possible that it is a wish-fulfillment of Velikovsky that Moses was a Hebrew and not an Egyptian? But the equation of Freud being Moses, and that Freud wanted to be Moses because then he would be a “freeborn”—and that, secondly, Freud wanted to be Moses because Moses was of royal blood was also an infantile-wish (why infantile?) is somewhat understandable. But, Velikovsky’s remark that “Freud transforms the elite character of the people (apparently the Jews have an “elite” character in Velikovsky’s view) into the “chosen” character of his own spiritual model seems to make little or no sense. What “spiritual model” is Velikovsky talking about—Moses as an Egyptian priest?

It is not a “chosen” “spiritual model” of the Jew—because the whole exercise is to “prove” that Moses was not a Jew! Is this Velikovsky’s fantasy of Freud wanting to preserve his Jewishness because Velikovsky himself is a Jew and it is difficult for him to face the fact that all of Freud’s permutations are to rid himself and Moses of being Jews altogether—and, in fact, members of the Royal Egyptian blood? This makes more sense as Velikovsky himself states that Freud’s wish fulfillment was that he be Egyptian and, as Not-a-Jew (“unlike the Jew”), a “freeborn” person?

According to Freud, Moses was not a Hebrew but an Egyptian child; his mother was not Johebed, the wife of Amram, but a princess (his father is unnamed). He was saved from the water and adopted not by the princess but by poor Hebrews. The correction, however, is soon extended: no reason exists for assuming that he was adopted by a Hebrew woman, and so he would not need to have been exposed by the princess.

At this point, Velikovsky is completely irrational. Freud nowhere states that he believed there really was a Moses who really was “saved from the water and adopted by the princess but by poor Hebrews.” Velikovsky makes this up, to satisfy an inner need of his own. Freud’s view was that Moses was always an Egyptian, that his name before the excision had the traditional prefixes appropriate (i.e., those given by Freud, and repeated by Velikovsky above, e.g. Thut-mose, Ra-mose, etc.).

It was not Moses who spoke about God to Pharaoh, but Pharaoh who taught Moses about the unique God. Moses did not flee from Pharaoh into the wilderness. Instead of competing with Moses in the magical arts, the Egyptian priests taught Moses violently to oppose all magic and to reject all mysteries. Moses was slow of speech—this is to be understood to mean that he had to speak through interpreters, not with Pharaoh, but with the Hebrews.

Obviously, if Velikovsky was right in his erroneously interpretation based on the wrong facts of the case, i.e., that Freud held that Moses was raised by poor Hebrews, even Freud would not have also averred that Moses “was slow of speech” because he could not speak Hebrew. Such obvious points as this totally discredit Velikovsky’s own “block in perception.”

And further, “our reconstruction leaves not room for . . . the ten plagues, [and] the passage through the Red Sea, and the solemn law-giving on Mount Sinai will not lead us astray.” (p. 54)

Since Freud does not perceive the inadequacy of his demonstration he is, according to psychoanalytic terminology, in a state of scotomization. But a psychic scotoma happens to be a proof that something touching the person very closely bears a disagreeable affect, which gives rise to a block in perception.

What Velikovsky means by Freud does not perceive the inadequacy of his demonstration”? Apparently, he means he does not understand what Velikovsky himself accepts as the “true” story behind the legend—the ten plagues, the miracle of the Red Sea parting, and God visiting Moses on Mount Sinai. What Velikovsky considers an “inadequate demonstration” is the acceptance of the Jewish legend itself. He has adduced no facts that prove Freud’s version is any less true than the implied elements of the story that Velikovsky accepts. All this is apparently ipse dixit (“because I say so”).

Such a lack of perception is in no case a defect of logical capacity, but rather a psychological phenomenon. In reality every scotoma retains its own logic. And there is logic in this case as well: Freud does not wish to recognize Moses as a Hebrew because he did not wish to recognize Sigmund as a Jew either. He does not consciously deny his adherence to the Jewish people at all; on the contrary, he emphasizes it at the very outset of the book. Nor would the idea of disowning his people ever consciously occur to him. But psychoanalysis has always taught us that it is not the conscious, but the unconscious material that is to be considered as decisive for the personality. That which is emphasized in the first few hours of the

analysis often serves the precise purpose of masking the unconscious impulses; indeed, who taught us to hear “yes” in place of “no” and “no” in place of “yes” in such utterances?

*Here again, Velikovsky seems to lose all sense of rationality himself. How does he know that the “idea of disowning his people” would never “consciously occur to him”? Velikovsky is no mind-reader. Indeed, I think the record proves the opposite—Freud frequently consciously thought about disowning his people. Velikovsky apparently cannot bear the idea that Freud would consciously want to—and repeatedly does—disown his own people. Much can be adduced to demonstrate that he often consciously expressed his hatred of Jews. (see my book *Passion for Murder and future remarks I will make on this subject*).*

In spite of the words in Freud’s introduction, “to deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons is not a deed to be undertaken lightheartedly,” there soon follows a slip of the pen: “We had *hoped* [our emphasis] the suggestion that Moses was an Egyptian would prove fruitful. . .” Accordingly, “Moses an Egyptian” would have to be translated as “Freud an Aryan, or free-born.” There is no illogic here: he would like to feel himself as not a pariah.

*It can be well-argued, I believe that Freud wanted to “deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons” because of his hatred for the sons of Israel. That is exactly why he “hoped “his “suggestion” that Moses was an Egyptian might be true. And, it must be emphasized that it was during the Nazi holocaust that Freud specifically wanted to “murder Moses”—not for any feigned desire for the truth—as his book *Moses and Monotheism* is one serial killer psycho-drama from beginning to end.*

Freud wrote this study—we should like to mention briefly—during the flowering of the race-theories of the elite character of the Aryans. Subsequently we shall attempt to investigate the more profound reasons for this renunciation of his race.

Freud not only wrote his study during the flowering of the race-theories of the elite character of the Aryans, but he wrote it amid the background of his own self-identification with the elite character of the Jew—a fact that certainly exacerbated conflicting racial claims of who was the truly elite character nation—the Jews or the Aryans. Extremists from both groups to this day maintain their ethnocentrically “chosenness.”

Velikovsky “lapses” into the truth of the matter when he speaks of “the more profound reasons for this renunciation of his race.” On the basis of what evidence does Velikovsky “know” that all of this effort on the part of

Freud was completely “unconscious”? It’s a ridiculous premise!

As I have said, I do not wish to adopt any position with respect to the historical reconstruction. Yet the personality of Moses appears to be completely altered by Freud’s hand; much falls away, and something else is added, and a shape appears before us which is a reflected image. Even if Freud is right, the remarkable fact of his interest in a historical personality, and also of his wonderful, divining insight, would be a proof of a psychic affinity which approaches spiritual identity. If Freud is wrong he is wrong as a historian. He remains, however, in the right as a poet, ruling over his poetry by virtue of his imagination.

It is truly remarkable that Velikovsky states that he does not wish to “adopt any position with respect to the historical reconstruction.” How can he possibly ever hope to avoid the issue? Certainly, he does not believe one whit in Freud’s “historical reconstruction”—so why will he not simply tell the truth and say so? He says he does not want to adopt “any position” and then goes on to assert that Freud has completely altered the “personality” of Moses. Of course, much falls away from the idea and image of Moses in Freud’s hands—indeed, Moses is not even Jewish—and something else is added. That which is added, Velikovsky makes clear, is Freud’s own fashioning of Moses in his own psychopathic self-image. Freud’s Moses is a “reflected image” of himself. Astoundingly, Velikovsky then states that—“Even if Freud is right, the remarkable fact of his interest in a historical personality and also of his wonderful, divining insight, would be proof of a psychic affinity which approaches spiritual identity.”

My Lord, what is Velikovsky be talking about? Has he left his senses altogether? Velikovsky is really saying the opposite of what his words would have us believe. He is really saying “Even if Freud is wrong, the remarkable fact of his interest . . . and also his wonderful, divining insight would be proof of a psychic affinity which approaches spiritual identity.” These remarks show the psychological schism Velikovsky himself has toward Freud, the subject of Jewishness of Freud’s place as a “diviner” and even, strangely enough, of what Velikovsky apparently believes is Freud’s “psychic affinity” with Moses which approaches a “spiritual identity.”

We must ask quite simply: What spiritual identity with Moses? Freud did not believe in God, he did not believe in the Mosaic Laws, he was an Anti-Semite, a killer, a serial killer, a sexual pervert who worshipped the Devil, who perverts the legends of Moses into an egoistic self-projection to “murder” his own people by depriving the Jews of their leader during a time when they were under an inhumanly unmerciful evil attack on the Jewish people. And Velikovsky acts as though he, too, is in a dream and himself can’t see the devil from the divine and mistakes in Freud the

Diviner rather than the Devil.

Velikovsky's last remark underscores the total collapse of his objectivity and his own idol-worshiping groveling before the feet of his Master:” If Freud is wrong he is wrong as a historian. He remains, however, in the right as a poet, ruling over his poetry by virtue of his imagination.”

As Velikovsky would have it, even when Freud is wrong, he is wrong only as an historian—not as a psychopathic scotomatic megalomaniac, which Velikovsky is at pains to prove in his article. Not only is Freud only wrong as an historian, he is in the right anyway and remains right as a poet—a poet who “rules over his poetry by virtue of his imagination.” Well, all poets rule over their poetry by their imagination—what else can they do? But what has this to do with Freud, he is no poet? Velikovsky's remarks are, sadly, idiotic, atavistic, and not worthy of himself in any regard. What is Freud in the right of, as a poet, I would ask, regarding the entire subject of Moses? It is a pity that Velikovsky did not sooner recognize that Freud was, in fact, a homicidal maniac and had he done so earlier he would not have indulged in this confused entangled commentary..

*In additional commentary on this subject of **Freud's Murder of Moses I** will show that Velikovsky's peculiar Jewish point of view of Freud is not an isolated example and that the “worship of the golden calf of Freud” is often found in the views of Jewish psychoanalysts in particular—and in the mind-set of representatives of Jewish culture who see in Freud one of their “finest.”*

POSTSCRIPT BY ERIC MILLER

Today, Immanuel Velikovsky's works are in disrepute. He acquired great fame in the early 1950's for his theory that within mankind's historical period, earth experienced a series of global catastrophes due to the action of cometary influences upon the earth. These catastrophe's, Velikovsky alleged, became the stuff of universal legends and myths that became incarnated into the various religions of the world. Freud knew and corresponded with many of the world's most influential scientists and scholars of his day including Freud, Jung, Einstein, etc. (see www.Vachrive.org). Velikovsky was a medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychoanalyst and historian.

I wish to acknowledge here that Velikovsky credited me with the correct psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud—despite the fact that Freud was one of his personal hero's and an avowed great inspiration in his life. The fact that Velikovsky came from a devoted Jewish family, his father being a Zionist

and great promoter of Jewish causes. In the late 1960's I became acquainted with Velikovsky and frequently corresponded with him and had dialog with him via telephone conversations on a variety of cultural issues. By the time I had become convinced that Freud was a "homicidal maniac" in 1976, Velikovsky's work was under attack. When he credited me with the correct psychoanalysis of Freud he admonished me more than one that "you must be very careful, they will do everything to discredit you." It was to Velikovsky's wife, more than anyone else, that I owe the writing and publication of my book *Passion For Murder: The Homicidal Deeds of Dr. Sigmund Freud*. Even after, her husband died, we continued to communicate and she constantly asked me at the outset of every call "Is there anything new on Freud?" She not only encouraged me at every turn but she even suggested that I use the Velikovsky name to gain access to important people in the Jewish community—most notably, Dr. Helen Schur, whose husband was Freud's doctor and who had many family records that I needed to find out what had happened to John Freud. I mention the above, to make clear that it was Elishiva Velikovsky herself who was most influential in pushing my work forward. I deeply mourned her passing and consider her one of my most important supporters ever.

The above said, and knowing that she not only would, but did, endorse my complete frankness concerning this matter of Freud and tracking his murder mania and everything involved with it, I add the following concluding remarks.

Because of the spell that Freud exerted over so many (comparable to the spell that Hitler exerted over so many, as his own granddaughter acknowledges and attests) Velikovsky himself was robbed of senses. I will briefly highlight a couple of points to make my point.

Velikovsky Fails To See Or Even Mention The Obvious In His Psychoanalysis of Freud Comments On The Murder Of Moses

Velikovsky in his above discussed article totally fails to bring to light the most glaring and important proof of Freud's deranged mind. For instance he fails to note that there was not one Moses in Freud's account—there were two! He fails to mention that Freud claims Moses (whether the one or both) was actually an Anti-Semite and that the Jewish people were guilty of the murder of Moses—which they persistently refused to acknowledge!

It cannot be doubted that Freud thought of the Jews (then the Hebrews) as murderous "savages" for he says so quite bluntly: "But while the tame Egyptians waited until fate had removed the sacred person of the Pharaoh, the savage Semites took their destiny into their own hands and did away with their tyrant [Moses]" (p.58) As the "fact" that there were two Jewish leaders called Moses Freud states: "To the well-known *duality* of that

history—*two peoples* who fuse together to form one nation. . .—we add two new ones: the founding of *two* new religions, the first one ousted by the second and yet reappearing victorious, *two* founders of religion [the Jewish religion}, who are both called by the same name Moses, and whose personalities we have to separate from each other.” (p.64).

How could Velikovsky have missed all of this? His entire psychoanalysis is that Freud “projected” himself into Moses and the story of Moses. How is it that Velikovsky (like so many Jewish psychoanalyst after him) totally miss that *Moses, the Anti-Semite was murdered by a group of savage Jews*? At least this is what Freud, the Anti-Semite would have us believe. Indeed, Velikovsky in his opening remarks speaks of Moses exercising a compelling effect on the spiritual vision of Freud—and yet he doesn’t even mention that there were two leaders of the new religion called Moses. Velikovsky opened his remarks in the first paragraph with these words: “Later it was Moses the law-giver, whose historic figure exercised a compelling effect on the spiritual vision of the creator of depth psychology.” Did Velikovsky, himself a member of the “elite” Jewish intellectual community **not know** that S.A. Yahuda, the renowned Jewish scholar, declared that in *Moses and Monotheism* “we hear the voice of one of the most fanatical Christians in his hatred of Israel”?

So to which Moses, of the two, is Velikovsky referring? And this when Freud himself states that we have to “separate the personalities of the two Moses,” the one from the other!—as the above quote proves.

I close this commentary with the remarks of another Jewish psychoanalyst, and one-time President of the American Psychoanalytical Society, Freud’s own doctor, Dr. Max Schur. To appreciate Schur’s remarks we must bear in mind the following comment from Freud about the Jews after they murdered Moses: “The poor Jewish people, who with their habitual stubbornness continued to disavow their father’s murder [of Moses], atoned heavily for it in the course of time. They were constantly met with the reproach, “You killed our God!” and this reproach is true, if it is correctly translated. If it is brought into relation with the history of religions, it runs: “You will not *admit* that you murdered God [ed, Moses] (the primal picture of God, the primal father, and his later reincarnations).” (Schur, p., 463-4).

As I shall later explicate, Dr. Max Schur knew that Freud was a murderer, knew that Freud murdered John Moses Freud, and conspired in the cover-up of several of Freud’s murders. It is no wonder then, that in his partial confession of the truth, it is in his chapter on Moses and Monotheism that he made his profoundly honest pronouncement: “I have added to this interpretation the aspect of the ‘guilt of the survivor’ with regard to Fliess and Freud’s brother , Julius [read John], that is the Cain complex in

addition to the Oedipus complex.”(Schur, p. 462). Of course, Cain too murdered his “Jewish” brother.

References

1. *Moses and Monotheism*, transl. by Katherine Jones (London, 1939), p. 164.
2. This conclusion of the essay called “Moses and Egyptian” was anticipated by a Jewish youngster in an anecdote: During the religious hour the instructor asked the class, “Who knows who Moses’ mother was?” The class was silent. A Jewish pupil present raised his hand and said: “Pharaoh’s daughter.” “How is that? She was the one who found him.” “That’s what *she* said,” answered the daring pupil.

Eric Miller’s References

1. *Moses and Monotheism*, transl. by Katherine Jones (New York, 1959)
2. *Freud Living and Dying*, Max Schur, (New York, 1972: International Universities Press)